Between Determinism and Liability A Reappraisal Based on Sapolsky, Villela, and Rosenvald

Abstract

This work investigates the legal implications of Robert Sapolsky's neuroscientific thesis, which denies the existence of free will and proposes a deterministic understanding of human behavior. Starting from the premise that Civil Law has as its cornerstone the notion of autonomy and responsibility, the research problematizes the effects of the deterministic view on the foundations of criminal imputability and civil liability. The central hypothesis is that, although science points to the biological conditioning of human actions, Law can maintain a normative conception of responsibility, guided by ethical and social criteria. The study examines the main philosophical currents in the debate between determinism and freedom, analyzes Libet's experiment, and confronts Sapolsky's view with João Baptista Villela's humanist proposal and Nelson Rosenvald's functional reinterpretation of civil liability. The objective is to construct an approach that recognizes the empirical limits of autonomy without compromising the regulatory and civilizing function of Law. It is concluded that, even in the face of the deterministic challenge, responsibility remains a necessary normative assumption, and that the legal system must evolve to incorporate ethical and preventive models, aimed at co-responsibility and the construction of a more just and effective legal order.